Caught by the Satellite: SEC Files Charges against Mexican-Based Company Homex

On March 3, 2017, the SEC published its complaint against Desarrolladora Homex, once one of Mexico’s leading homebuilders. The complaint alleged that Homex committed “massive fraud” when it reported the construction and sale of 100,000 homes that did not even exist.

The complaint alleges that Homex booked revenue from a development in the Mexican state of Guanajuato where it claimed that homes were built and sold by the end of 2011. However, satellite images taken in March 2012 showed that tens of thousands of those homes were “nothing but bare soil.” According to the SEC, through this fraudulent scheme Homex overstated its revenue by 355% (or approximately $3.3 billion).

Signs of trouble for Homex began as early as 2013 when Homex’s builder and his competitors suffered incredible losses on stocks and bonds. In 2014, Homex filed for the Mexican equivalent of bankruptcy protection and emerged under new leadership in 2015.

The new leadership at Homex proved unable to save the company from its prior financial woes. In April 2016, the SEC issued a Wells notice to Homex and indicated that the SEC had made a preliminary determination that Homex had committed various violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These violations were in connection with the company’s recognition of revenue related to home sales during 2010 through 2012. Although the company announced its plans to fend off the SEC from formal enforcement proceedings, those efforts proved futile. Months later, Homex was placed on a 20-month trading suspension and the instant enforcement proceedings soon followed.

Homex agreed to settle SEC accounting fraud charges without admitting or denying the allegations. The settlement, filed in the United States District Court in Southern District of California, permanently enjoins Homex from violating the antifraud reporting and books and records provisions of the federal securities laws. In the settlement, Homex also agreed to be prohibited from offering securities in the United States markets for a period of at least five years. This settlement is subject to a judge’s approval.

The SEC Heightens Its Interest in Robo-Advisers

Over the last two weeks, the SEC has put robo-advisers on notice that they are on the staff’s radar. First, on February 23, 2017, the SEC’s Division of Investment Management, along with the SEC’s Office of Compliance, Inspections, and Examinations, issued a Guidance Update for robo-advisers. The term “robo-adviser” refers to registered automated investment advisers that provide investment advice that uses computer algorithms. Robo-advisers generally collect information about a client’s financial goals, income, assets, investment horizon, and risk tolerance by way of an online or electronic questionnaire. With limited human interaction, robo-advisers use this information to create and manage investment portfolios for clients. Robo-advisers are often more economical than traditional investment advisers. Robo-advisers, which began as an appeal to millennials, are now widely becoming popular with all age groups and types of investors.

The Guidance Update focused on in three unique areas of the investment relationship: (1) the substance and presentation of disclosures to clients about the robo-adviser and the investment advisory services it offers; (2) the obligation to obtain information from clients to support the robo-adviser’s duty to provide suitable advise; and (3) the adoption and implementation of effective compliance programs reasonable designed to address particular concerns relevant to providing automated advice.

This Guidance Update specifically encourages robo-advisers to keep clients well-informed with respect to their use of algorithms to manage client funds. Robo-advisers must be diligent in their disclosures to clients of the risks and limitations inherent in the use of algorithms to manage investments. For example, an algorithm may not address prolonged changes in market conditions and investors need to know that. The Guidance Update also reminds robo-advisers that because of the limited human interaction with the client, issues, like disclosures, would most likely be done online. As such, communications, including written disclosures, should be effective, not hidden or indecipherable. Finally, the Guidance Update highlighted that for robo-advisers, compliance with the Advisory Act of 1940 may require more written documentation than regular investment advisers must provide. For example, robo-advisers should consider documenting the development, testing, and backtesting of the algorithms, the process by which they collect client information, and the appropriate oversight of any third party that develops or owns the algorithm or software utilized by the robo-adviser.

In addition to the Guidance provided to robo-advisers, the SEC Office of Investor Education and Advocacy also issued an Investor Bulletin on the subject of robo-advisers to alert potential clients to specific areas when dealing with a robo-adviser would be different from a more traditional adviser. Such areas include (1) the minimized level of personal interaction a client would receive, e.g., do you ever speak to a human?; (2) the standard information a robo-adviser uses to formulate recommendations, e.g., are the robo-advisers asking all the pertinent questions in their questionnaires?; (3) the robo-adviser’s approach to investing, e.g., are the robo-advisers using pre-determined portfolios or can you customize your investments?; and (4) the fees and charges involved, e.g., could you be charged penalties or fees if you want to withdraw your investment?  Investors should consider using robo-advisers because of the economic advantages but must be aware of the differences inherent in this new 21st century version of the investment advisor.

The SEC requires robo-advisers to be registered and makes them subject to the same substantive and fiduciary obligations as traditional investment advisers. In addition to the Alert and the Guidance Update, the SEC staff also addressed robo-advisers at SEC Speaks on February 24, 2017. At the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) panel, the office’s senior leadership put the audience and industry on notice of OCIE’s “Electronic Investment Advice Initiative.” Specifically, OCIE advised that it will be dedicating staff and resources to prioritize examining robo-advisers for this SEC fiscal year. Due to OCIE applying a risk-based approach to its examination program, they will likely focus on robo-advisers with large platforms or business models that OCIE believes pose potential risks to investors. For robo-advisers to prepare, we recommend that firms review the February 23, 2017 Guidance Update and the Office of Investor Education and Advocacy Investor Bulletin described above to proactively plan to be in compliance with this guidance. This way, firms examined as part of the Electronic Investment Advice Initiative, can attempt to avoid significant deficiencies or enforcement referrals from OCIE’s increased scrutiny of robo-advisers.

SEC Speaks 2017 – OCIE Had Something To Say

Last week, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Acting Chairman, senior leadership across Divisions and Offices, and former SEC Commissioners spoke at the “SEC Speaks” Conference 2017. Senior leadership from the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) used its panel and workshop to provide guidance on the reshaping of its examination programs that it began in 2016. Below we outline the revamped OCIE.

OCIE’s Reorganization & Reallocation of Resources

The OCIE panel included OCIE’s Acting Director and its Deputy Director. The commentators for the panel were former SEC Chairman Hon. Harvey L. Pitt and former SEC Commissioners Hon. Paul S. Atkins and Hon. Daniel M. Gallagher. At the beginning of the presentation, OCIE’s Acting Director reminded the audience that OCIE’s mission is to protect investors, ensure market integrity, and support responsible capital formation through risk-focused strategies that: 1) improve compliance; 2) prevent fraud; 3) monitor risk; and 4) inform policy. The panel explained that OCIE monitors and assesses its various programs to align with OCIE’s mission and strategies. The panel described that OCIE had developed and implemented a plan to revise its programs to better align with the evolving nature of the various registrants subject to its oversight.

The Investment Adviser / Investment Company Program

This past year, OCIE re-allocated 100 broker-dealer staff examiners to the Investment Adviser / Investment Company (IA/IC) Program, which increased the total number of OCIE staff in the IA/IC Program to over 600. OCIE’s Deputy Director reminded the audience that the investment management industry lacks a self-regulatory organization and that the number of investment advisers registered with the SEC continues to grow. For example, since January 1, 2017, approximately 200 additional investment advisers have registered with the SEC. Thus, the SEC and OCIE determined that a re-allocation of staff was necessary to manage the SEC’s responsibility as the sole inspection and examination authority for this industry. One of the goals of this reallocation appears to be to address the number of examinations per examiner, if feasible, from last year’s high of 4.91 per examiner. Following up on a proposal to the Commission last fall under Chair Mary Jo White, Commissioner Gallagher encouragingly questioned whether OCIE needs to consider the use of non-SEC, third-party examination firms. Although OCIE senior leadership did not seem enthused about this possibility, they replied that they would be willing to work with whatever ideas and initiatives the new Commission may have to assist with OCIE’s resource constraints, in particular with the continuing expansion of the investment advisory industry.

The Broker-Dealer, FINRA and Securities Industry Oversight, and National Broker-Dealer Exchange Group Programs

For the above three programs, OCIE has restructured its examination oversight of the brokerage industry and for certain other registrants. First and foremost, OCIE’s Broker-Dealer (BD) Program – as the industry has known it for the past few decades – no longer exists. Second, in addition to the reallocation of 100 examiners from the BD Program to the IA/IC Program, OCIE senior leadership outlined the creation and responsibilities of two new programs: the FINRA and Securities Industry Oversight (FSIO) Program; and the National Broker-Dealer Exchange Group (BDX) Program. While the BDX Program will maintain some broker-dealer examination staff, as explained below, this will be a significantly reduced number of examiners who will be focused on targeted examinations in coordination with FSIO’s oversight responsibilities.

FSIO is a national program with staff in the SEC’s home office and across various regional offices. OCIE created FSIO for several reasons, including avoiding the duplication of efforts and resources that sometimes occurred with FINRA. FSIO’s primary responsibility is the enhanced oversight of FINRA. FSIO also will oversee the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (for purposes of this blog, we focus on FINRA). While FSIO will maintain oversight responsibility, OCIE senior leadership emphasized that the plan is to work collaboratively with FINRA, as appropriate. FSIO’s Program will oversee FINRA in two ways; with programmatic and oversight examinations. The former will focus on FINRA’s programs and operations to provide guidance and recommended improvements, while the latter will involve specific FINRA examinations of member firms that FSIO will sample, examine, and provide feedback to FINRA.

The BDX Program has a broader mandate, including responsibility for: exchanges; transfer agents; the clearing and settlement program; (only) municipal advisors; the Securities Investor Protection Corporation; and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. BDX is also a national program with staff in the SEC’s home office and regional offices. As mentioned, the BDX Program also includes a limited number of broker-dealer examination staff to conduct targeted examinations and coordinate with FSIO regarding FINRA oversight examinations.

Conclusion / Takeaways

OCIE’s reallocation of staff resources to the IA/IC Program, dissolution of the BD Program, and creation of the FSIO and BDX programs reflect an SEC Office that is attempting to keep pace with the increasing and evolving registrant populations for which it is responsible by restructuring programs and targeting its limited resources. These efforts will likely have unintended (or intended) consequences for the investment management and broker-dealer industries. First, OCIE appears to be making its oversight of the investment management industry its main focus. This is the continuation of a multi-year effort, as this industry presents the greatest risk to OCIE and its understaffed IA/IC Program. That said, with a staff increase of 100 and the continuing emphasis on this program, the number of significant deficiencies and enforcement referrals generated by the IA/IC Program will correspondingly increase, as the quantity and frequency of examinations increases. With respect to OCIE’s BD, FSIO, and BDX Programs, with FINRA’s evolution and increased resources to examine the broker-dealer industry, it is not too surprising that the SEC, via OCIE, ceded responsibility to FINRA and dissolved the BD Program. A collateral result for the broker-dealer industry, however, will likely be an empowered FINRA that may seek to increase the assertiveness of its examination and enforcement programs. In conclusion, while the IA/IC Program and FINRA appear poised to enjoy increased authority, OCIE’s efforts are laudable in reorganizing itself to better allocate its limited resources to manage its responsibilities over its evolving registrant population.

Acting SEC Chairman Limits Delegated Formal Order Authority

Acting SEC Chairman Michael Piwowar has apparently revised the staff’s ability to subpoena records and investigative testimony (“formal order authority”) by returning the authority to grant formal order authority to the agency’s Director of Enforcement. While the SEC has not formally recognized this policy shift, multiple sources, including Law360 and the Wall Street Journal, have reported that Acting Chair Piwowar has recently implemented this change, which revokes the delegated authority to regional directors and enforcement associate directors to approve the staff’s requests for formal order authority.

In 2009, under Chair Mary Schapiro and as part of certain initiatives to enhance enforcement’s capabilities in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the SEC delegated its authority to authorize formal order authority to the Director of Enforcement. The Director of Enforcement, in turn, delegated this authority to regional directors and enforcement associate directors. As a result, the staff could, within an hour (when necessary) obtain formal order authority, as compared to the days, weeks, or at times months, that it had historically taken to obtain formal order authority from the Commission. Not unexpectedly, the number of formal investigations opened by the staff dramatically increased.

Acting Chair Piwowar’s recent move eliminates the second layer of delegation by limiting the 2009 delegated authority to the Director of Enforcement. While the effect of this change on the number of SEC investigations remains uncertain, multiple sources report that Acting Chair Piwowar enacted the policy not to reduce that number, but to bring greater oversight and consistency to the investigation process. Further, while he is not authorized to take the step alone, as it would require a vote of the Commission which is currently comprised of only two members, Acting Chair Piwowar and Commissioner Kara Stein, the acting chair has asked the SEC’s general counsel to consider whether the agency should further restrict formal order authority by returning the power to grant it to the SEC Commissioners. Thus, at Acting Chair Piwowar’s direction, the SEC is considering a return to the pre-2009 formal order authority review and approval process.

The revocation of the regional and associate directors’ delegated ability to approve formal order authority is the latest action taken by Acting Chair Piwowar, who stepped in as acting chairman after former Chair Mary Jo White stepped down at the conclusion of the Obama administration. His actions have included requesting that all authorities granted to staff members be reviewed and that public disclosure rules required by Dodd-Frank be reconsidered.  Such actions indicate efforts to begin the reshaping of the agency as it awaits the confirmation of President Trump’s nomination for chairman, Jay Clayton.

11th Circuit Nixes CPA’s Claim That SEC Sanctions Preclude Criminal Prosecution

On February 3, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected an accountant’s argument that the imposition of both criminal charges and SEC sanctions on the basis of the same alleged conduct violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. This appellate court ruling illustrates that defendants in SEC investigations and enforcement proceedings must be mindful that the imposition of civil penalties, disgorgement, and permanent bars do not preclude the prospect of criminal prosecution.

Thomas D. Melvin (“Melvin”), a certified public accountant, agreed in April 2013 to pay the SEC a civil penalty of $108,930 and disgorgement of $68,826 to settle alleged violations of Sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rules 10b-5 and 14e-3 thereunder. According to the SEC, Melvin purportedly had disclosed confidential insider information that he received from a client that pertained to the pending sale of a publicly traded company. A Rule 102(e) administrative proceeding in September 2015 also permanently barred Melvin from practicing before the SEC as an accountant. Exchange Act. Rel. No. 75844.

The Department of Justice instituted a parallel criminal proceeding against Melvin that involved the same alleged wrongful activity. Melvin moved to dismiss the eventual indictment on the ground that the collective sanctions the SEC had levied upon him constitutionally precluded a criminal prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause. After a federal district court denied his motion to dismiss, Melvin pleaded guilty to six counts of securities fraud pursuant to a written plea agreement. He then appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.

In United States v. Melvin, No. 16-12061 (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2017), the Eleventh Circuit conducted two inquiries to determine whether the imposition of the civil penalty, disgorgement and professional debarment against Melvin were so punitive that they rose to the level of a criminal penalty. For the initial inquiry, the court found that Congress intended the sanctions imposed by the SEC to be a form of civil punishment because monetary penalties are expressly labeled as “civil penalties” and the legislative branch empowered the SEC to prohibit an individual from appearing or practicing before it.

As to the second inquiry, the circuit court examined seven “useful guideposts” articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493 (1997). These guideposts included whether:

  1. “the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”;
  2. “it has historically been regarded as a punishment”;
  3. “it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”;
  4. “its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence”;
  5. “the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”;
  6. “an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and
  7. “it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.”

Applying these guideposts, the Eleventh Circuit believed that the sanctions at issue “constitute no affirmative disability or restraint approaching imprisonment” and observed that “neither money penalties nor debarment have historically been viewed as punishment.” It also noted that “penalties for security fraud serve other important nonpunitive goals, such as encouraging investor confidence, increasing the efficiency of financial markets, and promoting the stability of the securities industry.” As such, the appellate court concluded that Melvin’s criminal prosecution did not constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

This ruling is the most recent cautionary reminder that, even in this era of headline-grabbing civil penalties that far exceed those the SEC sought and obtained just a few years ago, defendants should never lose sight that the resolution of SEC charges does not preclude the prospect of a parallel criminal proceeding. Indeed, any time the SEC’s prosecutorial theory is potentially fraud-based, defendants and their counsel must remain extremely cautious to the possible involvement of criminal authorities and develop their legal strategies accordingly.

The SEC’s Form 1662 underscores this point. This form, which is provided to all persons requested to supply information voluntarily to the SEC or directed to do so via subpoena, states:

It is the policy of the Commission … that the disposition of any such matter may not, expressly or impliedly, extend to any criminal charges that have been, or may be, brought against any such person or any recommendation with respect thereto. Accordingly, any person involved in an enforcement matter before the Commission who consents, or agrees to consent, to any judgment or order does so solely for the purpose of resolving the claims against him in that investigative, civil, or administrative matter and not for the purpose of resolving any criminal charges that have been, or might be, brought against him.

The disposition of an SEC proceeding also does not prevent the SEC from sharing any information it has accumulated with criminal authorities. Instead, as Form 1662 warns, the SEC “often makes its files available to other governmental agencies, particularly United States Attorneys and state prosecutors” and there is “a likelihood” that the SEC will provide this information confidentially to these agencies “where appropriate.”

OCIE Highlights the Top 5 Compliance Topics from Examinations of Investment Advisers

On February 7, 2017, the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) issued a Risk Alert discussing the five most frequent compliance topics identified in OCIE examinations of investment advisors. The Alert was compiled based on deficiency letters from over 1,000 investment adviser examinations completed during the past two years. The top five topics are: (1) the Compliance Rule; (2) Regulatory Filings; (3) the Custody Rule; (4) the Code of Ethics Rule; and (5) the Books and Records Rule.

The Compliance Rule

The Compliance Rule requires: (1) written and policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act; (2) annual review of the policies and their implementation; and (3) a chief compliance officer who monitors the policies and procedures.  Examples of common Compliance Rule problems included:

  • Advisers did not follow their compliance policies and procedures;
  • Annual reviews were not performed or did not address the adequacy of the adviser’s policies and procedures;
  • Compliance manuals were not reasonably tailored to the adviser’s business practices; and
  • Compliance manuals were not current.

Regulatory Filings

OCIE frequently cited advisers for failing to make timely and complete regulatory filings, such as Form ADV (as required by Rule 204-1 under the Advisers Act), Form PF (as required by Rule 204(b)-1 under the Advisers Act), and Form D (as required by Rule 503 under Regulation D of the ’33 Act) on behalf of an adviser’s private fund clients. Timely, accurate, and appropriately amended regulatory filings, especially for these three forms, should be a priority for all advisers.

The Custody Rule

The Custody Rule, which applies to advisers who have custody of client cash or securities, is designed to safeguard client assets from unlawful activity or financial problems of the adviser.  OCIE identified the following common deficiencies or weaknesses with respect to the Custody Rule:

  • Advisers did not recognize they had “custody” due to: (1) having online access to client accounts, or (2) having other authority over client accounts (such as having power of attorney or serving as a trustee of client trusts); and
  • Surprise examinations by independent accountants were not actually a surprise, and advisers failed to fully disclose custody lists during surprise examinations.

The Code of Ethics Rule

The Code of Ethics Rule requires that advisers adopt and maintain a code of ethics that meets certain minimum requirements, and which is described in Form ADV and made available to clients or prospective clients. Deficiencies or weaknesses regarding the Code of Ethics Rule were often found because:

  • Advisers failed to identify all of their access persons;
  • Codes did not specify review of the holdings and transactions reports, and did not identify specific submission timeframes;
  • Submission of transactions and holdings were untimely; and
  • Advisers failed to describe their code of ethics in Form ADV.

The Books and Records Rule

The maintenance of books and records as dictated by SEC requirements is another frequent problem area according to OCIE. Some advisers had contradictory information within separate sets of records, while other advisers either maintained inaccurate records or failed to update their records in a timely fashion. Worse still, other advisers simply failed to maintain all of the records that the Books and Records Rule requires them to keep.

District Court Invalidates Tolling Agreements in Criminal Securities Fraud Prosecution Case Due to Misunderstanding of Applicable Statute of Limitations

On January 30, 2017, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the government’s indictment against Guy Gentile for a pump-and-dump securities fraud scheme. After his arrest Gentile admitted to having engaged in the scheme and agreed to cooperate, which included signing two tolling agreements, each extending the statute of limitations for one year. In dismissing the indictments, the court held that the tolling agreements were invalid and the applicable statute of limitations for securities fraud was five years, not six years.

According to the opinion, Gentile engaged in a securities fraud scheme that indisputably ended in June 2008, at which time the statute of limitations for securities fraud was five years. In 2010, however, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act extended the statute of limitations to six years for certain criminal securities fraud violations. Gentile was charged on June 25, 2012 and arrested on July 13, 2012, i.e. four years after the criminal conduct. Under interrogation, Gentile admitted to the fraud and agreed to cooperate with the government. Gentile entered into a tolling agreement with the government that tolled the limitations period from July 31, 2012 through July 31, 2013. Gentile subsequently signed a second tolling agreement, tolling the limitations period from July 31, 2013 through July 31, 2014. Gentile, however, refused to sign a third tolling agreement because he wanted all cooperation and criminal actions to be concluded by June 30, 2015. Critically, when entering the tolling agreements, both the government and Gentile assumed the statute of limitations was five years (the limitations period in effect at the time of the criminal conduct) and not six years (the limitations period in effect at the time of the arrest). Accordingly, at the time that the second tolling agreement expired, the government would have had to indict Gentile prior to July 31, 2015.

Unable to reach a plea deal, the government indicted Gentile in March 2016 and Gentile moved to dismiss. If the statute of limitations had been six years, the second tolling agreement would have presumably given the government until July 31, 2016 to indict. The court, however, disagreed. The court first found that, “limited to the specific facts of this case,” the tolling agreements were invalid because Gentile did not have a full understanding of the waiver. Slip Op. at 6. The court reasoned that “the waivers were executed unknowingly since Defendant clearly thought he was extending his exposure to criminal prosecution by two years when in fact, if the statute of limitations was six years, he was extending the period of exposure by three years.” Slip Op. at 7. That misunderstanding rendered the waivers invalid, with the effect that the statute of limitations was not tolled. Without a toll, the government’s deadline to indict was either June 30, 2013 (under the five-year limitations period) or June 30, 2014 (under the six-year limitations period). In either event, the March 2016 indictment was untimely.

After holding that the defendant’s ignorance of the potential six-year limitations period rendered the tolling agreements invalid, the court then held that the applicable statute of limitations is in fact five years, i.e., exactly what the Gentile had thought when he entered the tolling agreements. The court relied on the presumption against retroactivity absent express congressional intent. Since the applicable section of the Dodd-Frank act “contains no discussion nor mention of retroactivity, let alone clear intent that Congress intended th[e] section to apply to crimes committed prior to its enactment[,]” the six-year limitations period is not retroactive. Because the applicable statute of limitations was five years, even if the tolling agreements were valid, the indictment was untimely, as the tolling agreements would have only extended the statute of limitations until June 30, 2015.

A GAAP-Happy Month in SEC Enforcement

In January, the SEC settled no fewer than seven enforcement proceedings with companies that involved alleged violations of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). While the sheer number of settlements would have been remarkable on its own, when examined individually, these proceedings reveal both emerging enforcement initiatives and recent historical trends in accounting-based actions. This article spotlights three particularly noteworthy observations from the first month of 2017.

  1. The Emergence of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

In 2016, the SEC placed growing emphasis on perceived abuses of non-GAAP financial measures under Regulation G and Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K. This included the Division of Corporation Finance’s (CorpFin) Compliance & Disclosure Interpretations in May and former Chair Mary Jo White’s speech before the International Corporate Governance Network in June. On January 18, 2007, the SEC settled its first enforcement action predicated on this alleged activity. Exchange Act Rel. No. 79823.

The SEC claimed specifically that MDC Partners, Inc., a publicly traded marketing firm, violated Item 10(e)(1)(i)(A) of Regulation S-K, which requires issuers disclosing non-GAAP financial measures to present “with equal or greater prominence” the most directly comparable GAAP-based financial measure or measures. According to the Order, MDC Partners’ quarterly earnings releases for 2013 and 2014 improperly emphasized EBITDA, EBITDA margin, and free cash flow—all non-GAAP benchmarks—without satisfying this prominence requirement. Moreover, the SEC alleged that CorpFin had raised this particular concern with the company in 2012, but, despite representations to the contrary, the violation remained uncorrected.

The SEC contended that MDC Partners also ran afoul of Item 10(e)(1)(i)(B) of Regulation S-K, which requires issuers to reconcile “by schedule or other clearly understandable method” the differences between the disclosed non-GAAP financial measures and the most directly comparable GAAP-based financial measure or measures. MDC Partners purportedly violated this provision in 2012 and 2013 when it disclosed a non-GAAP metric known as “organic revenue growth.” The SEC alleged that the company omitted reference to one of the metric’s three reconciling items, and, had it been calculated consistent with the only two reconciling items that were disclosed, the metric would have been lower. Further, the company purportedly failed to include tabular reconciliations to GAAP revenue in its periodic reports and earning releases.

The SEC found that MDC Partners’ non-GAAP disclosures violated Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, Section 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act (and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder), and Rule 100(a)(2) of Regulation G. The company paid a $1.5 million civil penalty to settle these and other alleged violations.

  1. A Non-Reliance on Financial Statement Materiality

As in MDC Partners, there were two additional settlements last month that symbolized the SEC’s willingness to bring enforcement actions absent any quantitatively material misstatements in a company’s financial statements. A January 18, 2017 settlement with General Motors Company (GM) involved the automaker’s 2014 recall of more than 600,000 vehicles with defective ignition switches. Exchange Act Rel. No. 79825. The SEC alleged that GM engineers understood in 2012 that the ignition switches created a safety concern, but delayed more than a year in notifying those persons at the company responsible for assessing whether this concern gave rise to a loss contingency pursuant to Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 450. ASC 450 requires issuers to evaluate whether a loss is “probable” or “reasonably possible” and, if so, sets forth when an estimated loss must be recorded or otherwise disclosed.

Interestingly, while the Order stated that GM recorded approximately $41 million for potential recall costs shortly after the internal notice was provided, it sidestepped the issue of whether GM had a probable or reasonably possible loss contingency at any time during the alleged period of delay. It also made no determination on the material accuracy of any financial statement or disclosure that may have been impacted. Instead, the SEC charged GM with possessing insufficient internal accounting controls in violation of Section 13(b)(2)(B) that stemmed from the delay in evaluating whether a loss contingency existed. GM agreed to pay a $1 million civil penalty to resolve the matter.

The SEC’s January 19, 2017 settlement with HomeStreet, Inc. provides another example. Exchange Act Rel. No. 79844. The SEC contended that the diversified-services company entered into interest rate swaps to hedge its exposure to changes in fair market value on approximately 20 fixed-rate commercial loans. The Company sought to apply hedge accounting pursuant to ASC 815, which allows qualifying issuers to record the fair value of both the hedged and hedging items, thereby alleviating potential income statement volatility from market fluctuations. The SEC contended that, between 2011 and 2014, certain HomeStreet commercial loans and interest-rate swaps periodically failed to meet the effectiveness ratio designed to test whether the necessary hedge correlation actually existed.

The order claimed that the company’s balance sheets and income statements were misstated during this period, because hedge accounting was applied to certain loans when the hedge associated with those loans failed to qualify. Notably, the order did not allege any of these misstatements were material; to the contrary, it acknowledged that the company and its outside auditors had concluded that the accounting errors were not material in any reporting period and no restatements were necessary. The SEC charged HomeStreet with books and records and internal control violations under Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) for these GAAP-based deficiencies and imposed a $500,000 civil penalty for these and other violations.

  1. An Absence of Fraud Allegations

The SEC has pursued fraud-based claims in accounting matters with less regularity in recent years and, in turn, has increased its reliance on the less-imposing strict-liability provisions under Section 13 and negligence-based antifraud provisions under Section 17. January was no exception. None of the accounting settlements during the month included alleged fraudulent conduct, even though, in several instances, the tenor of the settlement language arguably signaled a more culpable state of mind than the violations required. In HomeStreet, the SEC also settled claims against the company’s chief investment officer, Darrell van Amen, who allegedly instructed a subordinate to make “unsupported adjustments” to the effectiveness ratio “for the purpose of making the testing results ‘effective.’” The Order also stated that the company made these adjustments to achieve effectiveness 64 times during the relevant period. The SEC charged van Amen under Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B). He agreed to pay a $20,000 civil penalty.

The HomeStreet settlement was not alone in this regard. The SEC instituted proceedings against L3 Technologies, Inc., an aerospace contractor, and Orthofix International, a medical device company, on January 11 and January 18, respectively. Exchange Act Rel. Nos. 79772, 79815. Both of these enforcement actions centered on allegations of improper revenue recognition in violation of ASC 605 and the recording of sales revenues before collectability was reasonably assured. In L3 Technologies, the order attributed this prohibitive conduct to “pressure from certain supervisors” to satisfy an annual operating plan, while the Orthofix order cited “a culture of aggressively setting internal sales targets and imposing pressure upon its sales personnel to meet those targets.” Both orders recounted material overstatements in revenue and attributed subsequent restatements to these improper deviations from GAAP.

Until recent years, these types of allegations routinely served as a blueprint for fraud-based claims. Then, the ensuing legal battle concentrated frequently on whether the SEC could establish the requisite state of mind. Now, under the current enforcement landscape, the absence of non-fraud claims renders the basic defense argument ineffective and, accordingly, often incentivizes cooperation and settlement. These two revenue recognition settlements in January are reflective of this trend. The SEC imposed a $1.6 million penalty on L3 Technologies for alleged Section 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) violations. Orthofix paid $8.25 million for its purported violations under Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3); Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B); and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-11, and 13a-13 thereunder. In each instance, the SEC recognized the company’s cooperation with its investigation.

Conclusion

January 2017 offered several prime examples of the current state of SEC enforcement in accounting-based actions. Of course, it also ushered in a new presidential administration and the prospect of substantial changes in policy and focus as SEC leadership readies to change. The coming months will offer an initial indication whether these emerging initiatives and recent trends continue to remain at the forefront of the SEC’s enforcement approach.

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