Alert: FINRA’s 529 Plan Share Class Initiative to Self-Report

On January 28, 2019, FINRA released its Regulatory Notice 19-04 announcing its 529 plan self-reporting initiative. This initiative is part of FINRA efforts to have broker-dealers promptly remedy potential supervisory and suitability violations related to recommendations of share classes for 529 plans.

To encourage self-reporting, for a limited time FINRA will offer favorable settlements where violations are found. These terms include no fine and no designation of “statutory disqualification.” However, the deadline to give FINRA notice that you intend to engage in the 529 plan self-reporting initiative is 12:00 a.m. Eastern time on April 1, 2019. Therefore, time is of the essence. This initiative is further detailed in the Drinker Biddle Client Alert linked below.

Read More: FINRA’s 529 Plan Share Class Initiative to Self-Report

Second Circuit Rejects Government’s Expansive Theory in Ruling that FCPA Does Not Extend to Foreign Nationals Without U.S. Ties

The Second Circuit ruled on August 24 in United States v. Hoskins that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) does not apply to foreign nationals who do not have ties to United States entities for bribery crimes that take place outside of U.S. borders. In doing so, the court rejected the government’s broadened theory of prosecution against Lawrence Hoskins, a U.K. citizen and former executive of the U.K.-based subsidiary of Alstom S.A., a global company headquartered in France that provides power and transportation services. United States v. Hoskins, No. 16-1010-CR, 2018 WL 4038192, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2018).

The alleged bribery scheme centers on Alstom S.A.’s American subsidiary, Alstom Power, Inc. (Alstom U.S.), headquartered in Connecticut. Hoskins was one of four Alstom executives charged with facilitating bribes to Indonesian officials in order to help the company win a $118 million power plant contract in Indonesia between 2002 and 2009. In 2014, Alstom S.A. pled guilty to the charge and paid a then record-setting $772 million fine.

The FCPA prohibits American companies and American persons, as well as their agents, from using interstate commerce in connection with the certain payments, or bribes, of foreign officials. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. The FCPA likewise prohibits foreign persons or businesses from taking acts to further certain corrupt schemes, including ones causing the payment of bribes, while present in the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. Hoskins never worked directly for Alstom U.S. or traveled to the U.S. while the alleged scheme was ongoing. However, he was a former executive of the U.K subsidiary of the Alstom S.A., the parent company of Alstom U.S. that allegedly paid bribes to Indonesian officials. Based on his position, the government indicted Hoskins as an agent of Alstom U.S. under multiple theories of liability including conspiring to violate the FCPA.

The Second Circuit was faced with deciding the issue of whether a foreign person who does not reside in the United States can be liable for conspiring or aiding and abetting a U.S. company to violate the FCPA if that individual is not in the categories of principal persons covered in the statute. As the court phrased it, “[i]n other words, can a person be guilty as an accomplice or a co-conspirator for an FCPA crime that he or she is incapable of committing as a principal?” The Second Circuit held that such a person could not be liable.

In their analysis, the court noted that the FCPA defined precisely the categories of persons who may be charged and the statute clearly states the extent of its extraterritorial application. “The statute includes specific provisions covering every other possible combination of nationality, location, and agency relation, leaving excluded only nonresident foreign nationals outside American territory without an agency relationship with a U.S. person, and who are not officers, directors, employees, or stockholders of American companies.”

While the government argued that U.S. law has historically allowed for individual liability of a crime even if that person was incapable of committing the substantive offense, the Second Circuit noted that FCPA legislation clearly did not intend that accomplice liability extend to persons known as the “affirmative-legislative-policy exception.” The court explained that there is no specific provision in the FCPA which assigns liability to persons who are “nonresident foreign nationals, acting outside American territory, who lack an agency relationship with a U.S. person, and who are not officers, directors, employees, or stockholders of American companies.” The court also noted that the legislative intent behind the language of the FCPA was to protect foreign nationals who may not know American law.

The impact of the Second Circuit’s decision not to extend FCPA liability to Hoskins will have ongoing consequences, as recognized in the case’s concurring opinion by Judge Gerard E. Lynch. “It is for Congress to decide whether there are sound policy reasons for limiting the punishment of foreign nationals abroad to those who are agents of American companies, rather than to those who make American companies their agents. Our only task is to enforce the laws as Congress has written them.” But the impact of the decision in light of the current FCPA statute, as Judge Lynch notes, creates a pervasive result: “It makes little sense permit the prosecution of foreign affiliates of United States entities who are minor cogs in the crime, while immunizing foreign affiliates who control or induce such violations from a high perch in a foreign parent company. That is the equivalent of punishing the get-away driver who is paid a small sum to facilitate the bank robber’s escape, but exempting the mastermind who plans the heist.”

While the Second Circuit’s decision in Hoskins may have limited the scope of foreign individuals in FCPA cases for now, it is likely that the DOJ will continue to prosecute similar cases that test the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA.

OCIE Issues Risk Alert on Issues Related to Best Execution by Investment Advisers

Pursuant to their fiduciary duties, investment advisers have certain obligations to seek out “best execution” for client transactions. The SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE) recently issued a Risk Alert identifying deficiencies found during examinations of investment advisers’ compliance with their best execution obligations.

In this alert, partner Jim Lundy and associate Kellilyn Greco outline OCIE’s findings, including background on best execution, notable deficiencies, and recommended best practices.

Read the full alert.

The Government Suffers a Spoofing Setback

On April 25, 2018, a New Haven federal jury acquitted a former trader with a global bank accused of scheming to manipulate the precious metals futures markets with “spoofing,” a trading tactic that involves the use of allegedly deceptive bids or offers to feign the appearance of supply or demand. This appears to be one of the first setbacks for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), and futures self-regulatory organizations since they began aggressively investigating and civilly and criminally charging futures traders with spoofing several years ago. After successfully defeating Michael Coscia’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, this aggression accelerated with the CFTC’s and DOJ’s coordinated charges in January against several firms and traders. This verdict, however, may cause them to re-visit their aggression and certain strategies.

While it is virtually impossible to fully comprehend the decision-making process behind a jury’s decision, several of the defense strategies apparently proved successful and may present strategies for others to apply in the future. Specifically, the defense themes included strenuously arguing that:

            * The prosecution’s trading analysis was “prosecution by statistics” and that people should not be “convict[ed] with charts and graphs”; and

            * The prosecution’s trading analysis amounted to an exercise in cherry-picking a few hundred trades out of more than 300,000 without presenting them in the full context.

Lastly, while the CFTC announced new advisories touting the benefits of cooperation, another defense strategy applied here involved vigorously attacking two prosecution witnesses who had “struck deals” with the government. All of these strategies proved successful as the jury returned its not guilty verdict one day after the trial concluded with closing arguments.

We will have to wait to see what, if any, impact this verdict has on other spoofing investigations and cases. In the meantime, however, the defense strategies applied here can be studied and applied to the defense of other spoofing cases being pursued by the CFTC and DOJ.

SEC Cyber Unit Brings Groundbreaking Data Breach Case

On April 24, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced its most significant case ever filed against a respondent for one of the world’s largest data breaches. Albata, Inc., f/d/b/a Yahoo! Inc., (“Yahoo”) settled with the SEC to charges of violating Section 17(a)(2) and 17 (a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), amongst other charges, and agreed to various remedies, including a $35 million penalty.

In summary, the SEC alleged that in December of 2014 Yahoo’s information security team learned that Russian hackers stole what was referred to internally as the company’s “crown jewels”: usernames, email addresses, phone numbers, birthdates, encrypted passwords, and security questions and answers for more than 500 million users. Although information relating to the breach was reported to members of Yahoo’s senior management and legal department, Yahoo failed to properly investigate the circumstances of the breach and to adequately consider whether the breach needed to be disclosed to investors. In addition, the SEC found that Yahoo did not share information regarding the breach with its auditors or outside counsel in order to assess the company’s disclosure obligations in its public filings.

The breach was not disclosed to the investing public until more than two years later, when in 2016 Yahoo was in the process of closing the acquisition of its operating business by another company. This disclosure caused a $1.3 billion fall in Yahoo’s market capitalization and a reduction in the acquisition price by $350 million.

As a result, the SEC’s order found that in Yahoo’s quarterly and annual report filings during the two-year period following the breach, the company failed to disclose the breach or its potential business impact, legal implications, and other potential ramifications. Finally, the SEC’s order finds that Yahoo failed to maintain disclosure controls and procedures designed to ensure that reports from Yahoo’s information security team concerning cyber breaches, or the risk of such breaches, were properly and timely assessed for potential disclosure.

In conclusion this SEC action provides several takeaways:

– This may be one of the first, but it will not be the last data breach case by the Division of Enforcement’s Cyber Unit created in September of 2017.

– The SEC charged Yahoo with fraud, but not with Rule 30(a) of Regulation S-P of the Securities Act. Historically, the SEC used the latter statute as the primary charge for data breaches. While these fraud charges against Yahoo are more aggressive, Section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) are non-scienter based charges.

– Notably, the SEC did not charge any individuals.

– A study of the findings in the SEC’s order coupled with the Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures announced on February 21, 2018, provides guidance for public companies and registrant firms to consider when assessing their cybersecurity programs, controls, policies and procedures, and disclosure obligations.

SEC Freezes $27 Million Related to a Blockchain/Cryptocurrency Acquisition

On April 6, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) obtained a court order freezing more than $27 million in proceeds from alleged illegal distributions and sales of restricted shares of a public company, and charged the company, its CEO, and three other affiliated individuals. That same day, the Nasdaq Stock Market said it halted trading in the company’s stock. The SEC’s complaint alleges that shortly after the company began trading on the Nasdaq Stock Market and announced the acquisition of a purported blockchain-empowered cryptocurrency business that its stock price rose dramatically until its market capitalization exceeded $3 billion. The SEC further alleges that the CEO and the three other individual defendants then illegally sold large blocks of their restricted shares to the public while the stock price was excessively elevated and that they collectively reaped more than $27 million in profits.

By way of background, and as alleged by the SEC, the company went public under a scaled-down version of a traditional initial public offering known as Reg A+ late last year. In December 2017, the company’s Class A shares began trading on the Nasdaq Stock Market. Two days later, the company announced that it had acquired the purported blockchain-empowered cryptocurrency business from another entity. The SEC alleges that one of the individual defendants held at least a 92% stake in this entity. The SEC further alleges that — notwithstanding that this acquired business had no ascertainable value — the company’s stock price rose excessively and quickly after said acquisition. Specifically, by December 18, 2017, the company’s stock price rose to a high of $142.82 per share; an increase of nearly 550% from the prior day’s closing price and about 2,670% above the company’s closing price on its first day of trading just several days earlier.

This action serves as yet another example of the SEC’s heightened and aggressive focus in this area. As we discussed previously on this blog, one of the focus areas for the SEC’s Cyber Unit that was created just last September is “Violations involving distributed ledger technology and initial coin offerings.” More recently, the financial press reported that the SEC had launched a “sweep” in this area by serving subpoenas and information requests on technology companies and investment management firms and brokers doing business in the virtual currency markets.

Returning to the SEC’s $27 million freeze action here, the SEC alleged only registration offering violations against the defendants. This may not be the last of the charges, however, as the SEC described this as a “continuing investigation” in its press release.

SEC Share Class Selection Disclosure Initiative to Encourage Self-Reporting

On February 12, 2018, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced a “Share Class Selection Disclosure Initiative” (“SCSD Initiative”), led by the Asset Management Unit of the Division of Enforcement (“Enforcement”). To encourage self-reporting and participation in the SCSD Initiative, Enforcement advises in the release that it “will agree not to recommend financial penalties against investment advisers who self-report violations of the federal securities laws relating to certain mutual fund share class selection issues and promptly return money to harmed clients.” Enforcement also warns that it “expects to recommend stronger sanctions in any future actions against investment advisers that engaged in the misconduct but failed to take advantage of this initiative.”

The deadline for self-reporting is June 12, 2018. Firms contacted by Enforcement before the announcement regarding possible violations related to their failures to disclose the conflicts of interest associated with mutual fund share class selection are not eligible for the program. Firms that are subject to pending SEC examinations, but that have not been contacted by Enforcement, will be eligible. Importantly, Enforcement specifically offers no assurances with respect to the potential liability of involved individuals.

Below we summarize the SCSD Initiative, explore the direct and indirect messages being sent by the SEC, and provide practical strategic guidance for affected firms to consider.

Initial Strategies – What to Do

By way of background, the SEC has long been focused on Rule 12b-1 fees paid by a mutual fund on an ongoing basis for shareholder services, distribution, and marketing expenses. As with any fee, 12b-1 fees have the potential to reduce a client’s returns. In recent years, the SEC has brought several enforcement actions against investment advisers, finding that they failed to disclose conflicts associated with the receipt of 12b-1 fees for investing client funds in a 12b-1 fee-paying share class when a lower-cost share class was available for the same fund.

What firms should consider the SCSD Initiative? Investment advisers that did not explicitly disclose in applicable Forms ADV (i.e., brochure(s) and brochure supplements) the conflict of interest associated with the 12b-1 fees the firm, its affiliates, or its supervised persons received for investing advisory clients in a fund’s 12b-1 fee share class when a lower-cost share class was available for the same fund. Enforcement provides more specific guidance as follows:

A “Self-Reporting Adviser” is an adviser that received 12b-1 fees in connection with recommending, purchasing, or holding 12b-1 fee paying share classes for its advisory clients when a lower-cost share class of the same fund was available to those clients, and failed to disclose explicitly in its Form ADV the conflicts of interest associated with the receipt of such fees. The investment adviser “received” 12b-1 fees if (1) it directly received the fees, (2) its supervised persons received the fees, or (3) its affiliated broker-dealer (or its registered representatives) received the fees. To have been sufficient, the disclosures must have clearly described the conflicts of interest associated with (1) making investment decisions in light of the receipt of the 12b-1 fees, and (2) selecting the more expensive 12b-1 fee paying share class when a lower-cost share class was available for the same fund.

Evaluating and assessing these factors for purposes of determining whether to self-report pursuant to the SCSD Initiative will be resource-intensive and will likely involve analyzing complex legal, factual and reputational issues. Thus, firms should first consult with in-house or outside counsel. One of the benefits of involving counsel at the start – and throughout – is that it allows for the application of the attorney work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege. As a reminder, the majority of the cases interpreting these privileges have not extended them to compliance officers performing their duties as part of a firm’s compliance operations. Thus, involving in-house or outside counsel is necessary to claim privilege. The firm can ultimately decide to waive privilege if it elects to self-report. However, for the firms that conduct this evaluation and assessment and then elect not to self-report, preserving the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges will allow firms to protect their work from discovery by regulators or third parties.

With the oversight of counsel, the firm should consider developing and implementing a project plan, due to the anticipated resource-intensive nature of what will be required. The project plan should involve analyzing whether the firm failed to disclose conflicts of interest associated with the receipt of 12b-1 fees by the adviser, its affiliates, or its supervised persons for investing advisory clients in a 12b-1 fee-paying share class when a lower-cost share class of the same mutual fund was available for the advisory clients. More specifically, this involves conducting detailed analyses of each fund, fund class, the 12b-1 fees associated with the share classes, and all of the related disclosures.

Settlement Terms – What You Need to Know

Enforcement uses the description “favorable settlement terms” in its announcement, in order to entice participation. Firms, however, need to understand that self-reporting under the SCSD Initiative will undoubtedly result in a settled enforcement action, and that the terms will include the SEC’s typical terms, with the exception of a civil penalty. Firms should also consider the nature of the charges and their potential impacts, as discussed below.

Terms may include a cease-and-desist order and a censure, likely along with an SEC release touting the settlement as a successful result of the SCSD Initiative. Settlement terms will include full disgorgement by the investment adviser of its ill-gotten gains and prejudgment interest thereon. It is not clear from the announcement how Enforcement will calculate disgorgement, but it will likely be based on the 12b-1 fees received. The firm will also need to agree to a self-administered distribution to its affected clients, thereby assuming all of the internal or external costs associated with such a distribution. Lastly, the settlement will either include an acknowledgment that the adviser has voluntarily taken the following steps (if completed before the order is instituted), or order that within 30 days of instituting the order, the eligible adviser:

  • Review and correct as necessary the relevant disclosure documents.
  • Evaluate whether existing clients should be moved to a lower-cost share class and move clients as necessary.
  • Evaluate, update (if necessary), and review for the effectiveness of its implementation policies and procedures to ensure that they are reasonably designed to prevent violations in connection with the adviser’s disclosures regarding mutual fund share class selection.
  • Notify clients of the settlement terms in a clear and conspicuous fashion (this notification requirement applies to all affected clients).
  • Provide the Commission staff, no later than 10 days after completion, with a compliance certification regarding the applicable undertakings by the investment adviser.

The charges in the settlement order would be considered non-scienter and negligence-based, but the plain statutory language reads much harsher. The statutes under which a Self-Reporting Adviser will be settling for the violative conduct are Section 206(2) and Section 207 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”). Section 206(2) prohibits an investment adviser, directly or indirectly, from engaging “in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client,” and imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers to act for their clients’ benefit, including an affirmative duty of utmost good faith and full disclosure of all material facts. Section 207 of the Advisers Act makes it “unlawful for any person willfully to make any untrue statement of a material fact in any registration application or report filed with the Commission . . . or willfully to omit to state in any such application or report any material fact which is required to be stated therein.” Thus, based on the plain language of these statutes, these are by no means technical-type violations. Firms need to consider their exposure to reputational harm and other collateral damage. Moreover, a Self-Reporting Adviser will have to disclose the institution and resolution of the charges in its Form ADV, as well as in response to requests for proposals and certain other information requests.

Finally, for those Self-Reporting Advisers participating in the SCSD Initiative, Enforcement will likely expect them to disclose information and produce evidence with respect to employees who were involved with the sale of 12b-1 class shares to clients, as well as those involved in the Self-Reporting Adviser’s disclosure of conflicts of interest. Accordingly, as advisers navigate their way through the process of determining whether it is in their best interest to participate in the SCSD Initiative, they should also be sensitive to the possibility that certain employees may need separate representation due to potential conflicts of interest that may arise.

Conclusion

The decision to self-report and participate in the SCSD Initiative deserves serious consideration, but there is no one-size-fits-all approach. As discussed, the decision-making process will be resource-intensive and involve complex and high-stakes legal, factual and reputational decisions, so firms should work closely with counsel. That said, here are five key takeaways for firms to consider:

  • Engage with in-house or outside counsel at the start for the attorney-work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege to apply, subject to waiver by the firm if the determination is made to self-report.
  • A project plan should be developed and implemented under the oversight of in-house or outside counsel to evaluate and assess whether the firm’s practices and disclosures warrant consideration of self-reporting pursuant to the SCSD Initiative.
  • Firms need to understand that, while avoiding a civil penalty, the settlement terms will include a cease-and-desist order and a censure; disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and the accompanying internal or external distribution costs; and the detailed undertakings discussed above.
  • Firms also should recognize that settling to charges under Section 206(2) and Section 207 of the Advisers Act present reputational risks that need to be weighed, and collateral consequences that need to be considered.
  • Lastly, firms that determine that they qualify as Self-Reporting Advisers should heed the SEC’s warnings and self-report, or they will potentially expose themselves to the SEC pursuing significant monetary penalties and possible additional charges and remedies.

Bitcoin Prices Continue Volatile Surge Despite Increasing Regulatory Scrutiny

In recent days, Bitcoin prices have surged past $11,000 before dropping back to around $10,000. This represents a more than 1000% growth since the start of 2017. In the last month alone, the price has more than doubled. This surge follows the announcement by the CME Group, the world’s leading derivatives marketplace, to launch Bitcoin futures on December 18. CBOE Global Markets Inc. also intends to launch a Bitcoin futures soon. Both received a green light from the CFTC today, December 1, through the process of self-certification – a pledge that the products do not run afoul of the law. There are also rumors that NASDAQ will launch a futures contract based on Bitcoin in 2018.

Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency, a digital asset designed to work as a medium of exchange using cryptography to secure the transaction and verify the transfer of assets with no need for a bank or other middleman. It is one of many new virtual currencies. Many startups have attempted “Initial Coin Offerings” or ICOs to raise funds in an attempt to create a new virtual currency. Other startups have attempted to launch various platforms as exchanges or ways to utilize Bitcoin and similar virtual currencies.

The SEC, CFTC, and other regulators in the United States and around the world are taking an active role in regulating Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies and bringing enforcement actions when necessary.

As early as 2013, the SEC’s office of Investor Education and Advocacy issued an investor alert on Ponzi schemes using virtual currencies. In July of this year, the SEC Division of Enforcement issued an investigative report “cautioning market participants that offers and sales of digital assets by ‘virtual’ organizations are subject to the requirements of the federal securities laws.” In March of 2017, the SEC rejected a bitcoin ETF on the basis that “significant markets for bitcoin are unregulated.” So far, no ETFs have been approved. In August, the SEC temporarily suspended the trading activity of three public companies that indicated they were likely to engage in an “initial coin offering” for a new digital currency. Earlier this month, the SEC Division of Enforcement issued a statement warning that celebrity endorsements of initial coin offerings and similar investments may be unlawful if they “do not disclose the nature, source, and amount of any compensation paid, directly or indirectly, by the company in exchange for the endorsement.”

Since 2015, the CFTC has taken the position that it views Bitcoin and other virtual currencies as commodities under the Commodity Exchange Act. Coinflip operated a trading platform with put and call options for Bitcoins in 2014 but did not follow regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act. Coinflip agreed to a settlement with the CFTC. It was not subject to a fine but was required to cease and desist from violating the act as well as subject to additional undertakings. As part of its order, the CFTC for the first time found that Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are properly defined as commodities. Aitan Goelman, the CFTC’s Director of Enforcement, commented: “While there is a lot of excitement surrounding Bitcoin and other virtual currencies, innovation does not excuse those acting in this space from following the same rules applicable to all participants in the commodity derivatives markets.” On October 4, 2017, the CFTC issued a “Primer on Virtual Currencies.” The primer warns of the extensive risk of fraud with virtual currencies and reaffirms the CFTC’s enforcement authority.

Bitcoin’s future is still uncertain. Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein tweeted in October that “Still thinking about #Bitcoin. No conclusion – not endorsing/rejecting. Know that folks also were skeptical when paper money displaced gold.” Others have made up their mind. At a Barclay’s conference in September, J.P. Morgan’s Jaime Dimon called Bitcoin “a fraud worse than tulip bulbs.” A common critique of Bitcoin is that it is mostly used by tax evaders, money launders, and others wanting to avoid government scrutiny. Such secrecy may not last. The IRS recently won a court victory over Coindesk, one of the top Bitcoin exchanges, in a demand for a list of all Bitcoin users making transactions worth more than $20,000. The case is U.S. v. Coinbase, 17-01431, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California (San Francisco).

Companies utilizing virtual currencies may be using the money of the future, but they will face the regulators of today.

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